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Treasury and Federal Reserve 
Foreign Exchange Operations 
This report, presented by Dino Kos, Executive Vice 
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 
Manager, System Open Market Account, describes 
the foreign exchange operations of the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System 
for the period from July 2001 through September 
2001. Evangeline Sophia Drossos was primarily 
responsible for preparing the report. 
During the third quarter, the dollar depreciated 
7.3 percent against the euro and 4.1 percent against 
the yen. On a trade-weighted basis, the dollar ended 
the quarter 2.6 percent lower. Shifting expectations 
about the pace of the U.S. economic recovery influ-
enced changes in the exchange value of the dollar. 
Economic data released even before the terrorist 
attacks on September 11 suggested that the U.S. eco-
nomic slowdown would likely be more protracted 
than previously expected, which generally weighed 
on the dollar. The attacks heightened pre-existing 
concerns about the weakness of the U.S. economy 
and lent further momentum to the general trends that 
prevailed earlier in the quarter. The U.S. monetary 
authorities did not intervene in the foreign exchange 
markets during this quarter. After the terrorist attacks, 
the Federal Reserve established thirty-day reciprocal 
swap arrangements with the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the Bank of England and temporarily 
augmented its existing swap facility with the Bank of 
Canada. The ECB drew on the swap facility on three 
occasions. 
Figure 1. Trade-weighted Group of Three currencies, 2001:Q3 
[graph plots three lines: Euro, Yen, and Dollar from  July through September. All three start at 100 in the  beginning of July.  By the beginning of August the Yen and Dollar are  down to about 99 and the Euro is up to about 103. Late  August the Dollar is down to about 97, the Yen is around  100, and the Euro is about 104. Early September the  dollar climbed to about 98, but then started dropping. On  September 11 the dollar was about 97, yen about 102,  Euro about 104. on September 17 the dollar was down to  about 95.5, the yen about 102.5, the euro about 105.  The end of quarter 3 ended with dollar at about 97, yen  about 101.5, and euro about 104.] 
NOTE. In this chart and those that follow, the data are for business days 
except as noted. 
SOURCES. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, and the Bank of England. 
DOLLAR DEPRECIATES THROUGH EARLY 
SEPTEMBER AMID INCREASED UNCERTAINTY 
OVER THE PROSPECTS FOR US. ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY. 
After reaching new multiyear highs on a trade-
weighted basis early in the quarter, the exchange 
value of the dollar declined amid increased expecta-
tions for a more protracted economic slowdown 
in the United States and a broad retrenchment from 
risk positions. The euro appreciated against the dollar 
early in the quarter, rising as high as $0.9182 on 
August 21, as shifting expectations for relative 
growth differentials between the United States and 
the euro area prompted investors to expand their long 
euro positions. The euro's initial appreciation coin-
cided with reports of shorter-term investors having 
established long positions in the euro. According to 
data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC), net noncommercial long euro positions 
on the International Money Market futures exchange 
rose steadily over the quarter and on August 28 
reached their highest levels since the inception of the 
euro. However, market participants suggested that 
these net long euro positions may have limited the 
euro's gains somewhat later in the quarter, as inves-
tors were reluctant to extend positions further. 
The dollar also depreciated against the yen, which 
strengthened against a wide range of currencies. 
Investors bought yen to cover short positions amid 
expectations that funds from Japanese accounts 
would be repatriated from overseas investments 
ahead of the Japanese fiscal-half-year-end. CFTC 
data indicated that noncommercial accounts reported 
net short yen positions against the dollar through the 
end of July, but these positions were reversed in 
August. In early September, the number of net long 
yen positions reached its highest level in almost two 
years. Figure: 2. Dollar-euro swap differentials, 2001:Q3 
[graph plotting two lines: ten-year dollar rate less ten-year  euro rate, and two-year dollar rate less two-year euro rate  from July through September. The Ten-year begins quarter  3 at about 30 basis points, two-year at about 73.  Throughout August the ten-year varies between about 65  and 40 basis points, two year between about 15 and -5  basis points. September 11 the ten year is at about 40 basis  points and the two-year about -10. On September 17 the  ten-year is about 20 and the two-year about -20. The  ten-year ends the quarter at about 10 basis points, the  two-year at about -35.] 
SOURCE. Bloomberg L.P. 
U.S. economic data reported early in the quarter 
showed weakness in both the nonmanufacturing and 
manufacturing sectors, as well as an increase in 
the rate of unemployment, and suggested that the 
U.S. economic slowdown could be more prolonged. 
Among these data reports were the larger-than-
expected declines in the U.S. nonfarm payroll data for 
June and August. Regional economic surveys, such 
as the Chicago Purchasing Managers Index released 
in July and the Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey 
released in August, also pointed to ongoing contrac-
tion in manufacturing activity. The August 8 release 
of the Federal Reserve's Beige Book was interpreted 
by many as suggesting that weakness in the manu-
facturing sector had spilled over into the broader 
economy. Indications of a nascent stabilization in the 
U.S. manufacturing sector, represented by modest 
increases reported in the National Association of 
Purchasing Managers surveys for July and August, 
were overshadowed by ongoing concerns about U.S. 
corporate profitability as analysts continued to lower 
their earnings forecasts. 
Concerns about the U.S. economic outlook were 
mirrored in other economies as euro-area and Japa-
nese economic data indicated further deterioration. 
In the euro-area countries, data showed continued 
declines in the manufacturing sector, particularly in 
Germany where factory orders fell sharply in July. 
Data released in August indicated the slowing pace of 
economic activity, as second-quarter data for German 
GDP were flat and showed the lowest year-on-year 
growth rate since 1998. In Japan, economic growth 
was negative in the second quarter as consumer 
spending and business investment remained stagnant. 
In this environment, many central banks eased mone-
tary policy; from the beginning of the quarter through 
early September, the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and 
the Reserve Bank of Australia each lowered their 
policy rates 25 basis points. The Bank of Canada 
lowered its policy rate 50 basis points. Implied yields 
on global interest rate futures contracts fell in 
response to the policy rate cuts by central banks and 
the heightened expectations of additional easing. 
Over this period, interest rate differentials between 
the United States and the euro area narrowed. The 
sharpest declines in U.S.-euro area swap spreads 
occurred in the short end of the curve, with the 
two-year U.S. swap rate falling below the two-year 
euro-area swap rate for the first time since the incep-
tion of the euro. 
Figure: 3. Group of Three government yield curves, 2001:Q3 
graph plotting three lines: ten-year minus two-year  Japanese government bond yield, ten-year minus two-year  U.S. Treasury yield, and Ten-year minus two-year  German bund yield from July through september.  Japanese starts at about 125 basis points, U.S. at about  115, and German at about 90. They stay fairly flat until  early september, when German and U.S. start to rise. On  September 11 German is about 100 basis points, U.S. is  about 130, and Japanese is about 135. On September 17,  German is at about 125, Japan about 130, and US about 170.  At the end of the quarter U.S. is about 175 basis points,  and Japan and Germany about 130 basis points.] 
SOURCE. Bloomberg L.P. 
Figure: 4. Global benchmark equity indexes, 2001:Q3 
Graph comparing three lines: S&P 500, Topix, and DJ  Euro Stoxx from July through September. They all start  at about 100, and all trend down. S&P 500 hits about  96 late July, Topix about 92, DJ Euro Stoxx about 94.  Late August S&P 500 is at about 93, Topix about 88,  DJ Euro Stoxx about 85. On September 11, S&P 500 is  about 88, Topix about 82, DJ Euro Stoxx about 70.  On September 17 S&P 500 is about 84, Topix about 78,  and DJ Euro Stoxx about 69. They end out the quarter  with S&P 500 at about 84, Topix about 80 and DJ Euro  Stoxx about 71.] 
SOURCE. Bloomberg L.P. 
Increased expectations for slowing global growth 
prompted investors to pull back from higher-risk 
assets. Global equity indexes and prices on corporate 
debt declined broadly amid increasing pessimism 
about corporate profitability worldwide. These fac-
tors, as well as the rate cuts by central banks, contrib-
uted to declines in short-dated sovereign debt yields 
and to the steepening of sovereign yield curves as investors shifted from nongovernment, fixed-income 
securities and equities into safer, more liquid assets. 
Developments in Latin America may also have con-
tributed to heightened risk aversion early in the quar-
ter as investors expressed ongoing concern about the 
ability of Argentina to meet its debt-servicing obli-
gations. The Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus 
(EMBI+) sovereign spread over comparable U.S. 
Treasury securities, which had already widened con-
siderably earlier in the year, spiked higher in July. 
Figure 5. Volatility implied by one-month currency option prices, 1998-2001:Q3 
[two graphs, one plotting Dollar-yen and Euro-dollar from 1998 to the third quarter of 2001. the second graph plots  Dollar-yen and Euro-dollar for the three months of 2001 Quarter 3: July through September.]  [First graph. Beginning of 1998 Dollar-yen starts at about 13%, Euro-dollar about 10%. They both trend down,  Dollar-yen to about 12% and Euro-dollar to about 8% by mid 1998. Dollar-yen then jumps to about 19% and varies  between that and 15% until the fourth quarter of 1998, euro-dollar jumps to about 15% in the fourth quarter. Dollar-yen  has a spike to about 28% in the fourth quarter. They drop to about 16% and 18% respectively by early 1999. They both  hit about 10% mid 1999. Dollar-yen spikes to about 23% in the fourth quarter of 1999, but both are at about 10% near  the end of the year. They both rise to about 15% in the second quarter of 2000. During the fourth quarter of 2000,  euro-dollar rises to about 17% and dollar-yen drops to about 17%. They both start 2001 at around 14%, slide to about  8-12% in mid 2001, and end at about 10-12%.] 
[second graph. In the beginning of July 2001 the dollar-yen is about 9.5% and euro-dollar about 10%. Mid-july  dollar-yen is still around 9.5% and Euro-dollar rises to about 12%. During the first quarter of August they lower to  the dollar-yen at about 8.5%, euro-dollar to about 10.5%. They rise to peak in the middle of August at 12% for  Dollar-yen and 12.5% for Euro-dollar. Early September dollar-yen is about 10.5%, euro-dollar about 11%. On  September 11 Dollar-yen is about 13.5% and euro-dollar about 14%. There's a jump down to about 12% for each  then back up to 14.5% for each mid-september. They both slide down, dollar-yen ending at about 10.75% and  Euro-yen about 11.5%.] 
SOURCE. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 
RISK AVERSION HEIGHTENS FURTHER AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS. 
The September 11 terrorist attacks heightened con-
cern about the risks to the U.S. economy, prompting 
further reductions in risk positions. Against this back-
drop, foreign exchange trading volumes declined, 
as investors were reluctant to establish new posi-
tions. Nevertheless, trading in the currency markets 
appeared orderly but subdued, as many New York 
dealers moved their activities to local contingency 
sites and overseas offices in the days immediately 
following the attacks. In addition, implied volatility 
on Group of Three currency options spiked after the 
attacks but within days quickly declined, reflecting 
the relatively stable behavior of spot currency rates. 
At the same time, market participants continued to 
protect against the risk of dollar depreciation as one-
month risk reversals showed a preference for dollar 
puts against the euro and the yen. 
Figure 6. U.S. and euro-area policy rates and implied yields 
on interest rate futures contracts, 2001:Q3 
[graph plotting four lines: ECB two-week minimum bid rate, Federal Funds  target rate, December 2001 Euribor futures contract implied yield, and  December 2001 eurodollar futures contract implied yield. The ECB two  week minimum bid rate was 4.5% July through August, dropped to 4.25%  until September 17. then dropped to 3.75%. The Federal funds target rate  started at 3.75% though mid-August, then dropped to 3.5% until September  17 then dropped to 3%.  The Euribor futures contract implied yield and eurodollar futures contract  implied yield both start at about 4.2%. Euribor drops to about 4% by the  end of July and eurodollar drops to about 3.6%. End of August Euribor is  about 3.8%, eurodollar about 3.45%. September 11 Euribor is about 3.75%,  eurodollar is about 3.1%. September 17 Euribor is about 3.7%, eurodollar  is about 2.75%. They end the quarter with Euribor at about 3.45% and  eurodollar at about 2.5%.] 
SOURCE. Bloomberg L.P. 
Expectations for near-term interest rate cuts 
increased after September 11, as market participants 
anticipated that the short-term economic effect of the 
attacks on the U.S. economy would generate sizable disruptions in business activity and sharp declines 
in consumer confidence. In response to the increased 
uncertainty generated by the attacks, many central 
banks lowered their policy rates. On the morning of 
September 17, before U.S. equity markets resumed 
trading after four days of closure, the Federal Open 
Market Committee lowered the federal funds target 
rate 50 basis points. Later that day, the Bank of 
Canada, the ECB, and the Swiss National Bank also 
cut rates 50 basis points. The next day, the Bank of 
Japan lowered its discount rate 15 basis points and 
announced an increase in its target for current account 
bank reserves, and the Bank of England lowered its 
repurchase agreement rate 25 basis points. 
In contrast to the sharp price action in some other 
asset markets, the dollar traded within a relatively 
narrow range from September 11 to the end of the 
quarter. The dollar was little changed on balance 
against the euro after the attacks, despite the 
increased uncertainty about the U.S. economic out-
look. Increased demand among global investors for 
the relative safety and liquidity of shorter-dated U.S. 
Treasury securities helped the dollar partially retrace 
earlier declines. The yen initially continued to appre-
ciate against other major currencies, ahead of the 
Japanese fiscal-half-year-end, reaching a high of 
116.38 yen per dollar on September 20. The exchange 
rate closed the quarter at 119.56 yen per dollar, how-
ever, after intervention activity by the Japanese mone-
tary authorities late in the quarter aimed at weakening 
the yen. Japanese monetary authorities publicly con-
firmed sales of yen against dollars on September 17 
and additional sales of yen on six subsequent occa-
sions through the end of the quarter. 
Figure 7. The dollar against the euro and the yen, 2001:Q3 
[graph comparing yen per dollar and dollars per euro from  July through September. July starts with yen per dollar at  about 124, dollars per euro about .850. Early August yen  per dollar is still about 124, dollars per euro about .875.  Late August yen per dollar is about 119, dollars per euro  about .913. Early September there is a jump in yen per  dollar to about 121 and dollars per euro to about .860.  September 11 yen per dollar is about 120, dollars per euro  about .915. On September 17 yen per dollar is about 118,  dollars per euro about .925. They end the quarter with yen  per dollar about 120 and dollars per euro about .910.] 
SOURCE. Bloomberg L.P. 
Figure 8. U.S. Treasury coupon yields and federal funds target rate, 
2001:Q3 
[graph comparing federal funds target rate, two year note,  ten year note, and thirty year bond from July through  September. The federal funds target rate started at about  3.8% and stayed there until it was dropped to about 3.5%  mid August. On 17th of September it was dropped to about  3.0%. Beginning of July, two year note was about 4.2%,  Ten year note about 5.3%, and thirty year bond about 5.7%.  Beginning of August two year note was about 3.8%, ten  year about 5.0%, thirty year bond about 5.6%. September  11 two year note was about 3.5%, ten year note about 4.9%,  thirty year bond about 5.4%. On September 17, two year  note was about 3.0%, ten year note about 4.5%, thirty year  bond about 5.3%. They end the quarter with two year note at  about 2.9%, ten year note about 4.6%, and thirty year bond  about 5.4%.] 
SOURCE. Bloomberg L.P. 
After the September 11 attack, the shift out of 
higher-yielding markets into perceived safe-haven 
assets pressured the Australian and the New Zealand 
dollars, which depreciated broadly, while the Swiss 
franc strengthened against other major currencies. An 
additional factor that boosted demand for Swiss 
francs was position-covering, in anticipation of Swiss 
franc appreciation, by investors who had borrowed 
the currency to fund positions in higher-yielding 
assets. Investors' broad-based reductions in risk posi-
tions also prompted sharp declines in emerging-
market and noninvestment-grade corporate debt. The 
EMBI+ sovereign spread over comparable U.S. Trea-
sury securities reached its widest level in almost two 
years, and U.S. high-risk corporate yield spreads 
reached their highest levels since 1991. 
Figure 9. Foreign currency per U.S. dollar, 2001:Q3 
[graph comparing three currencies per dollar: Australian dollar,  Canadian dollar, and Swiss franc. Anything over 100 is U.S. dollar  appreciation, anything under 100 is U.S. dollar depreciation.  They all begin July at about 100. By the end of July Australian dollar  is about 100, Canadian dollar about 102, and Swiss franc about 95.  End of august , Australian dollar is about 95, Canadian dollar about 102,  and Swiss franc about 93. on September 11 Australian dollar is about  98, Canadian dollar about 103, and Swiss franc about 92. On  September 17, Australian Dollar is about 102, Canadian dollar about 104,  and Swiss franc about 90. They end the quarter with Australian dollar  and Canadian dollar about 104, and Swiss franc about 91.] 
SOURCE. Bloomberg L.P. 
TEMPORARY SWAP LINES ESTABLISHED WITH 
OTHER CENTRAL BANKS. 
To facilitate the functioning of financial markets and 
provide liquidity in U.S. dollars, the Federal Reserve approved the establishment of temporary reciprocal 
swap arrangements with the ECB and the Bank of 
England on September 12 and September 14 respec-
tively. Additionally, on September 13, the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of Canada agreed to a tempo-
rary augmentation of the swap facility already in 
place. Under the terms of these agreements, the ECB, 
the Bank of England, and the Bank of Canada would 
be able to draw up to $50 billion, $30 billion, and 
$10 billion, respectively, in exchange for local cur-
rency. These arrangements allowed the central banks 
to provide dollar proceeds of the swaps to be tempo-
rarily lent to local banks to facilitate the settlement 
of their dollar transactions. The temporary swap 
arrangements with the ECB and the Bank of England, 
as well as the augmentation with the Bank of Canada, 
expired after thirty days. 
The ECB drew on its swap line on September 12, 
13, and 14. The net amount drawn totaled $5.4 billion 
on September 12, $14.1 billion on September 13, and 
$3.9 billion on September 14. As of September 17, 
the net amount outstanding fell to zero, and there was 
no further swap activity through the end of the quar-
ter. The Bank of England and the Bank of Canada did 
not draw on their respective swap lines during the 
quarter. 
Figure 10. Emerging-market and U.S. high-yield spreads 
over U.S. Treasuries, 2001:Q3 
[graph comparing EMBI+ spread and Merrill Lynch  high-yield spread from July through September. Beginning  of July, EMBI+ is about 760, Merrill Lynch about 730.  Beginning of August EMBI+ is about 960, Merrill Lynch  about 720. On September 11, EMBI+ was about 900 and  Merrill Lynch about 740.  On September 17, EMBI+ was about 980 and Merrill  Lynch about 855. The quarter ends with EMBI+ at about  1000 and Merrill Lynch at about 920.] 
SOURCES. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co. 
TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE RESERVES. 
The U.S. monetary authorities did not undertake any 
intervention operations during the quarter. At the end 
of the quarter, the current values of the euro and 
yen reserve holdings totaled $15.4 billion for the 
Federal Reserve's System Open Market Account and 
$15.4 billion for the Treasury's Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Fund. The U.S. monetary authorities invest their 
foreign currency balances in a variety of instruments 
that yield market-related rates of return and have a 
high degree of liquidity and credit quality. To the 
greatest extent possible, these investments are 
split evenly between the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury. 
A significant portion of the U.S. monetary authori-
ties' foreign exchange reserves is invested in Euro-
pean and Japanese government securities held 
outright or under repurchase agreement. Under euro-
denominated repurchase agreements, the U.S. mone-
tary authorities accept sovereign debt backed by the 
full faith and credit of the following governments: 
Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Spain. Foreign currency reserves are also 
invested in deposits at the Bank for International 
Settlements and in facilities at other official institu-
tions. As of September 28, direct holdings of foreign 
government securities totaled $13.6 billion, split 
evenly between the Federal Reserve and the Trea-
sury. Foreign government securities held under repur-
chase agreement totaled $2.8 billion at the end of the 
quarter and were also split evenly between the two 
authorities. 
Box: Discontinuation of''Treasury and Federal 
Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations" 
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
The quarterly report''Treasury and Federal Reserve For-
eign Exchange Operations,'' by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, will not be reprinted in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin after the December 2001 issue. Each quarter's 
report is available soon after the end of the quarter on 
the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(www.newyorkfed.org/pihome/news/forex/), which also 
has the reports back to 1996. The reports for years before 
1996 are available in paper copies from the Public Infor-
mation Department, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045 (tel. 212-720-
5424). 
Other reprints will also be eliminated from the Bulletin 
after December 2001: the monthly report on industrial 
production and capacity utilization, congressional testi-
mony, the FOMC minutes, and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York's annual ''Domestic Open Market Opera-
tions'' report (the text portion of '' Open Market Opera-
tions'' will be reprinted in the Board's Annual Report 
rather than in the Bulletin). The documents are widely 
distributed when originally published, and several 
sources for historical information are available. [end of box.] 1. Foreign currency holdings of U.S. monetary authorities based on current exchange rates, 2001:Q3 
Millions of dollars 
NOTE. Balances are now stated at amortized cost. Beginning balances have 
been restated to conform with the new presentation. Figures may not sum to 
totals because of rounding. 
Note on Net purchases and Sales: 
Purchases and sales for the purpose of this table include foreign cur-
rency sales and purchases related to official activity, swap drawings and repay-
ments, and warehousing. 
Note on Effect of Sales: 
This figure is calculated using marked-to-market exchange rates; it 
represents the difference between the sale exchange rate and the most recent 
revaluation exchange rate. 
Note on Interest Collected: 
Current value change in foreign currency from interest collected on 
matured investments. 
Note on Revaluation and Interest Receivables: 
Foreign currency and interest receivables are marked to market daily at 
prevailing rates. 
Item  Balance, 
June 29, 2001  Quarterly changes in balances, by source: Net purchases 
and sales 
Quarterly changes in balances, by source: 
Effect of 
sales 
Quarterly changes in balances, by source: 
Interest 
collected 
Quarterly changes in balances, by source: 




Sept. 28, 2001 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
OPEN MARKET ACCOUNT 
(SOMA): 
Euro  6,792.0  .0  .0  87.6  501.0  .0  7,380.6 
SOMA: Japanese yen  7,570.2  .0  .0  .6  349.2  .0  7,920.0 
SOMA: Total  14,362.2  .0  .0  88.2  850.2  .0  15,300.6 
SOMA: Interest receivables  67.1 
na  na  na 
4.9  -6.6  65.4 
SOMA: Total  14,429.3  .0  .0  88.2  855.1  -6.6  15,366.0 
U.S. TREASURY EXCHANGE 
STABILIZATION FUND (ESF): 
Euro  6,787.0  .0  .0  86.3  500.6 
na 
7,373.9 
ESF: Japanese yen  7,570.3  .0  .0  .6  349.2  na 
7,920.1 
ESF: Total  14,357.3  .0  .0  86.9  849.8  na 
15,294.0 
ESF: Interest receivables  66.4 
na  na  na 
4.9  -5.9  65.4 
ESF: Total  14,423.7  .0  .0  86.9  854.7  -5.9  15,359.4 
Table 2. Net profits or losses (-) on U.S. Treasury 
and Federal Reserve foreign exchange operations, 
based on historical cost-of-acquisition exchange rates, 
2001:Q3 
Millions of dollars 
Period and item: 
Valuation profits and losses on 
outstanding assets and liabilities, 









Euro  -1,665.4  -1,881.8 
Japanese yen  508.2  720.4 
Total  -1,157.2  -1,161.4 
Period and item: Realized profits and losses 
from foreign currency sales, 
June 29, 2001-Sept. 28, 2001 




Euro  .0  .0 
Japanese yen  .0  .0 
Total  .0  .0 
Period and item: Valuation profits and losses on 
outstanding assets and liabilities, 
Sept. 28, 2001 




Euro  505.9  505.5 
Japanese yen  349.2  349.2 
Total  855.1  854.7 
Table 3. Reciprocal currency arrangements, September 28, 2001 
Millions of dollars 
Reciprocal  currency  arrangements  Institution  Amount of 
facility 
Outstanding, 
Sept. 28, 2001 
Bank of Canada  10,000(see note 1)  .0 
Bank of Mexico  3,000  .0 
European Central Bank  50,000 (see note 2)  .0 
Bank of England  30,000 (see note 3)  .0 
Total  93,000  .0 
Note 1. Includes temporary augmentation of existing $2 billion swap arrangement. 
Note 2. Temporary thirty-day swap arrangement. 
Federal Reserve  and U.S. Treasury  Exchange  Stabilization Fund  Currency  Arrangements 
Institution  Amount of 
facility  Outstanding, 
Sept. 28, 2001 
Bank of Mexico  3,000  .0 
Total  3,000  .0 
Table 4. Daily European Central Bank swap facility activity, 
September 12-15, 2001 
Millions of dollars 
Date  Drawings  Repayments  Amount 
outstanding 
Sept. 12  5.4  .0  5.4 
Sept. 13  14.147  .0  19.547 
Sept. 14  3.915  14.147  9.315 
Sept. 15  .0  9.315  .0 